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ESCAPING THE ABYSS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
TO END INDEFINITE DETENTION WITHOUT COUNSEL 
BRANDON BUSKEY* 
INTRODUCTION: INDEFINITE DETENTION WITHOUT COUNSEL IN MISSISSIPPI 
Indefinite detention. It is a phrase most recently associated with the War on 
Terror that the United States launched after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. It conjures the military camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the 
country detained hundreds of those it labeled “enemy combatants” for years 
without trial. Many were found guilty of the accusations against them. Many 
were not. But our nation’s failure to respect the rule of law has forever tainted 
our confidence in those results. Most Americans would perhaps be surprised to 
learn that indefinite detention is not an anomaly sprung from the existential 
threat of 9/11. Rather, it was engineered on our shores, and it is alive and well. 
I discovered this truth for myself during the summer of 2014, when, as a 
staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, I began investigating the 
indefinite detention of those held prior to trial in Mississippi. In 2003, the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”) reported that, across the state, felony 
arrestees could be held in jail for months or years before trial, or before even 
being formally charged.1 Widespread deficiencies in the state’s public 
defender system had also been extensively documented.2 Our goals were to 
find whether the practice had survived in the decade since the LDF report, and, 
if it did, to isolate a particularly virulent strain of the problem: indefinite 
detention of the poor without access to counsel. 
Our investigation took us to twelve counties in each of the state’s major 
geographic/cultural regions, including the Delta, the Gulf Coast, and the 
 
* Senior Staff Attorney at the Criminal Law Reform Project of the American Civil Liberties 
Union and lead counsel on Burks v. Scott County, No. 3:14-cv-00745-HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. 
Sept. 23, 2014). 
 1. SARAH GERAGHTY & MIRIAM GOHARA, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION 
FUND, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (2003), https://static. 
prisonpolicy.org/scans/Assembly_Line_Justice.pdf [http://perma.cc/EQY6-3RTM]. 
 2. See, e.g., PHYLLIS E. MANN, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, 
MISSISSIPPI: A SHORT STORY (2010), http://nlada.net/library/article/ms_ashortstory [http://perma. 
cc/6U7A-NMEJ]. 
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Appalachian Foothills.3 In our conversations with public defenders, 
prosecutors, judges, and policymakers across Mississippi, it became clear that 
the phenomenon had deep roots. In almost every county, local officials 
described systems by which arrestees who could not afford counsel were held 
for months or longer without seeing a lawyer. Amazingly, those in counties 
that only required arrestees to languish in jail for “only a few weeks” typically 
viewed themselves as exemplary. Even where the county did make an arrestee 
wait for months, some other county was always worse. 
We eventually identified three structural reasons why Mississippi’s 
criminal justice system breeds indefinite detention without counsel. The first is 
that under the state constitution, a district attorney must obtain an indictment 
from a grand jury before prosecuting a felony.4 But state law does not place 
any limit on how long a felony arrestee may be held in jail before a prosecutor 
obtains an indictment. The absence of such a limit converts this supposed right 
into a ransom, holding arrestees hostage to their own constitutional protection. 
Mississippi is by no means an outlier in this regard. Eighteen states do not 
have a statute-specified time frame in which formal charges must be filed—
either by indictment or information.5 Six states require the filing of charges 
between three months and six months of arrest.6 Ten states require the filing of 
charges between one month and three months of arrest.7 Fifteen states require 
the formal filing of charges within a month of arrest.8 Thus, the majority of 
 
 3. See View By Region, MISSISSIPPI ARTS COMMISSION (2013), http://www.arts.state.ms. 
us/folklife/view-by-region.php [http://perma.cc/G4EJ-UL9D]. 
 4. MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 27. 
 5. The states are as follows: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. 
 6. Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1201 (West, Westlaw through 2017)); North Carolina 
(N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15-10 (2016)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-6 (2016)); South 
Carolina (S.C. R. CRIM. P. R. 2 (2016); S.C. R. CRIM. P. R. 3 (2016)); Pennsylvania (PA. R. CRIM. 
P. 600 (West, Westlaw through 2017)); and Texas (TX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 32.01 (2015); Ex 
parte Martin, 6 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). 
 7. Arkansas (ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.6 (West, Westlaw through 2017)); Delaware (DEL. SUP. 
CT. CRIM. R. 48 (2017)); Iowa (IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.33 (2017)); Kentucky (KY. R. CRIM. P. 5.22 
(2016)); Louisiana (LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 701 (West, Westlaw through 2017)); Maine 
(ME. R. CRIM. P. 48 (2016));  Maryland (MD. R. 4-212 (West, Westlaw through 2017); MD. R. 4-
221 (West, Westlaw through 2017)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.178 (2015); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.196 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.035 (2015); Berry v. Clark 
County, 571 P.2d 109 (1977)); New Mexico (NM. R. MAG. CT. R. 6-203 (2016); NM. R. DIST. CT. 
R. 5-302 (2016); NM. R. DIST. CT. R. 5-201 (2016)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN § 970.01 
(2017); WIS. STAT. ANN § 970.03 (2017); State v. Evans, 522 N.W.2d 554, 563 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1994)). 
 8. Arizona (ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 4.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 
(West, Westlaw through 2017); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 13.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017)); 
California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017)); Florida (FL. ST. 
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states allow individuals to be held at least a month without formal charges.9 
However, many states mitigate this risk with speedy trial laws mandating that 
trials occur within specified times of arrest.10 Mississippi’s speedy trial act, 
however, triggers after indictment, not arrest, and it still allows the state 270 
days after indictment to commence a felony trial.11 
The second reason for indefinite detention is historical. Across the state, 
judges and court officers still “ride circuit” within a judicial district. The term 
evokes images of 19th Century judges riding on horseback or in carriages from 
courthouse to courthouse to conduct the judicial business of each locality. 
Today, the practice involves court personnel traveling among county seats—
presumably by car—for set periods over the course of a year.12 For example, in 
a district comprised of four counties, there will be a trial term in each county 
three times a year, with each term lasting about a month.13 Trial terms 
generally overlap with convenings of the grand jury. By design, there will be 
approximately two months between each trial session in this hypothetical 
district. 
The risk of delay under this system is immediately apparent. Someone 
arrested on a felony during a trial term stands almost no chance of their case 
being presented to the sitting grand jury. They must instead wait two months 
until the next grand jury. If they cannot make bail, they must spend two 
months in a jail cell just waiting for the next session. Many districts, 
 
CRIM. P. R. 3.134 (2016)); Idaho (I.C. § 19-615 (2016); I.C.R. 5.1 (2016); I.C.R. 7 (2016)); Illinois 
(725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/109-3.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
34-1-4(b)(1) (2016); Pawloski v. State, 380 N.E.2d 1230, 1234 (Ind. 1978)); Michigan (MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.26 (West, Westlaw through 2017)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 766.4 
(West, Westlaw through 2017)); Minnesota (MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02 (2016); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 
5.01 (2016); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 8.02 (2016)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-203 (2015)); 
New York (N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.80 (2017); People ex rel. Maxian on Behalf of 
Roundtree v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. 1991)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 135.745 
(2016)); Utah (UTAH R. CRIM. P. R. 7 (West, Westlaw through 2017)); Vermont (VT. R. CRIM. P. 
3 (2016); VT. R. CRIM. P. 5 (2016)); Washington (WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. P. R. 3.2.1 (2016)); 
and Wyoming (WYO. R. CRIM. P. 5 (2016)). 
 9. Virginia generally belongs to this group. However, because its charging statute is keyed 
to trial terms rather than finite days from arrest, and because judicial circuits differ substantially 
with respect to the frequency of trial terms, it cannot easily be classified into any of the above 
categories. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-242 (2016). The Virginia Circuit Court terms can be found at 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/directories/circ.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL69-JYAF]. 
 10. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.71 (West, Westlaw through 2017) (requiring 
felony trial within 270 days of arrest). 
 11. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-17-1 (West, Westlaw through 2017). 
 12. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-7-3 (West, Westlaw through 2017). 
 13. See Circuit Court Terms in Delbert Hosemann, Secretary of State, 2017 Mississippi 
Judiciary Directory and Court Calendar, at 34–40, available at http://www.sos.ms.gov/Educa 
tion-Publications/Documents/Downloads/2017%20JudicialDirectory/2017%20Judiciary%20Di 
rectory%20%20Court%20Calendar.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6VM-TG8R]. 
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particularly in more rural areas—and Mississippi is very rural—have only two 
or three trial terms per year, forcing arrestees to wait three to five months just 
to see if the grand jury acts on their case. Compounding matters, local officials 
in several counties reported that cases are rarely presented to the grand jury 
during the next trial term either. Our arrestee in the hypothetical district must 
now wait five to six months to learn her fate with the grand jury. 
To determine how long arrestees actually wait until indictment, we 
surveyed public defenders from seventeen of the state’s twenty-one judicial 
districts.14 The results confirmed that these hypothetical concerns are quite 
real. Almost without exception, indictments typically occurred within six 
months to a year of arrest, and no public defender reported that the district 
regularly secured indictments within three months of arrest.15 
The third driving force behind indefinite detention is another omission. 
Mississippi is one of six states that delegates non-capital, trial-level defense 
entirely to its counties.16 There are no standards for the timing of counsel 
appointment, nor is there any oversight mechanism to enforce existing 
constitutional and ethical standards for appointed counsel. In this void, many 
districts wait until an arrestee is indicted to appoint counsel. 
This perfect storm of deficiencies has helped spawn a culture of apathy 
toward the accused. To minimize the costs of providing appointed counsel, 
many counties use a flat-fee contract system to retain public defenders.17 These 
arrangements usually involve a county contracting with one or more attorneys 
to handle all or some percentage of the county’s indigent caseload. The 
contracting attorneys typically accept this work on a part-time basis, 
maintaining a private practice along with their defender duties.18 The county’s 
incentive to control costs is thus passed on to the public defender. As each new 
appointed client reduces the marginal value of the contract, while also 
threatening the time the attorney can devote to “paying clients,” defenders 
naturally look to minimize their time on appointed cases.19 One of the lasting 
memories from our investigation was a part-time public defender who candidly 
 
 14. Brandon Buskey & Marshall Thomas, Mississippi Public Defender Survey (Dec. 2014) 
(on file with author). 
 15. Id. 
 16. MANN, supra note 2. 
 17. OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, THE STATE OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
MISSISSIPPI: REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS (2014), http://www.ospd.ms.gov/MS%20Report% 
20updated%20October%202014.pdf [http://perma.cc/68U7-FLED]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. JON MOSHER, FLAT FEE CONTRACTS, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
(2010), http://www.nlada.net/library/article/na_flatfeecontracts [http://perma.cc/DPX4-9BAQ] 
(“Because the lawyer will be paid the same amount, no matter how much or little he works on 
each case, it is in the lawyer’s personal interest to devote as little time as possible to each 
appointed case, leaving more time for the lawyer to do other more lucrative work.”). 
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admitted that she did not know her clients existed until indictment, and that, if 
she was to “keep the lights on” at her private practice, she could not afford to 
know them. 
As open secrets go, indefinite detention without counsel may be one of 
Mississippi’s most shameful. A lack of reliable data prevents an accounting of 
the number of people victimized by the state’s de facto system of indefinite 
detention. But the practice was apparent wherever we visited. 
Our investigation culminated in a lawsuit challenging the system of 
indefinite detention without counsel in Scott County, Mississippi. Located 
about forty-five minutes east of the capital Jackson, Scott County had all the 
features that make indefinite detention so pervasive. There are only four trial 
terms per year. Along with the other three counties in the district, Scott County 
only appointed counsel at indictment. Finally, the county relied on a part-time, 
flat-fee contract to retain public defenders. 
The two named plaintiffs in the class action lawsuit we ultimately filed in 
federal court exemplified the problems in Scott County and the rest of the 
state.20 The first, Josh Bassett, spent eight months in jail on a $100,000 bail he 
could not afford.21 He was charged with a nonviolent property offense.22 The 
second, Octavious Burks, had spent ten months in jail on a $30,000 bail he 
could not afford for an alleged attempted armed robbery.23 Mr. Burks was no 
stranger to Scott County’s indefinite detention system. He had spent fully three 
of the previous five years in the Scott County Detention Center on a variety of 
felony offenses.24 Each time the county released him without an indictment.25 
A few days after we filed our lawsuit in September 2015, the county released 
both Mr. Bassett and Mr. Burks without requiring bail.26 Mr. Bassett’s charges 
were eventually dismissed; Mr. Burks was never indicted.27 
But, the most shocking aspect of the lawsuit was our main defendant, then-
senior district court judge Marcus Gordon. When Gordon died earlier this year, 
he was celebrated in the New York Times for his role in giving the maximum 
 
 20. This paragraph is based primarily on the author’s knowledge gathered as lead counsel on 
Burks v. Scott County, No. 3:14-cv-00745-HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2014). Citations to 
filed court documents have been provided in notes 20–26, infra, for the benefit of the reader. All 
errors or omissions belong to the author. 
 21. Class Action Compl. at ¶¶ 23, 27, Burks v. Scott County, No. 3:14-cv-00745-HTW-LRA 
(S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2014). 
 22. Id. at ¶ 21. 
 23. Am. Class Action Compl. at ¶¶ 7, 9, 12, Burks v. Scott County, No. 3:14-cv-00745-
HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2014). 
 24. Id. at ¶¶ 21–24. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 42, 46. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 44. Mr. Burks did take a plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm in a 
separate federal prosecution for the same incident. Id. at ¶ 30. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
670 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:665 
sixty-year sentence to Edward Ray Killen, the man convicted in 2005 of the 
infamous 1964 assassination of three civil rights workers in Philadelphia, 
Mississippi.28 But in September 2015, when the Times interviewed Gordon 
about our lawsuit, he seemed less the civil rights champion. When asked why 
he prefers to wait until indictment to appoint counsel, he offered, “The reason 
is, that public defender would go out and spend his time and money and cost 
the county money in investigating the matter . . . . And then sometimes, the 
defendant is not indicted by the grand jury. So I wait until he’s been 
indicted.”29 As to indigent arrestees who want help prior to indictment to 
challenge their arrest or lower their bail, Gordon was unmoved. Such a person 
“can represent himself, or he can employ an attorney.”30 Gordon’s callousness 
may have been unique, but the system of indefinite detention he helped 
maintain was all too common. 
Scott County, and Mississippi more generally, present a vexing challenge. 
Particularly in a country purportedly committed to the presumption of 
innocence, the Kafkaesque practice of warehousing people prior to trial is 
abhorrent on a number of levels. Yet it is not clearly unconstitutional. Below, I 
discuss the Court’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence to identify 
the proverbial cracks into which so many criminal defendants have slipped. 
Specifically, though the Court has held that criminal defendants have a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel for all “critical stages” of the prosecution, it has 
never held that the initial appearance is one of those critical stages. More 
importantly for places like Mississippi, the Court’s critical stage jurisprudence 
does not—and perhaps cannot—address when counsel must be appointed if the 
state detains someone but delays or does not conduct any subsequent critical 
stage before trial. 
However, when and if the Court does confront the issue of indefinite 
detention without counsel, I propose that the Sixth Amendment lens, with its 
heavy focus on trial outcomes, is ultimately too myopic to offer meaningful 
solutions. The Court should instead return to the doctrinal roots of fundamental 
fairness and equal justice that animate its seminal decision in Gideon v. 
Wainwright,31 and that drives the Court’s access to courts jurisprudence. This 
new lens focuses on whether the state has provided meaningful access to the 
 
 28. Sam Roberts, Marcus D. Gordon, Judge in ‘Mississippi Burning Case’, Dies at 84, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/us/marcus-d-gordon-judge-in-missis 
sippi-burning-case-dies-at-84.html [http://perma.cc/MP4X-JMQX]. 
 29. Campbell Robertson, In a Mississippi Jail, Convictions and Counsel Appear Optional, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/in-a-mississippi-jail-con 
victions-and-counsel-appear-optional.html [http://perma.cc/FQ7E-C534]. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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pretrial process without regard to wealth. Indefinite detention without counsel 
cannot survive such a standard. 
I.  CRITICAL STAGES AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment requires that states provide attorneys for felony32 
and most misdemeanor trials,33 as well as sentencing.34 Once a prosecution has 
begun, the Sixth Amendment also secures a right to counsel for certain pretrial 
proceedings. As early as 1932, the Supreme Court recognized that because the 
pretrial period was “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings,” it 
necessitates “the guiding hand of counsel” to avoid emptying the right to a fair 
trial of all its force.35 However, the right to counsel prior to trial is not 
absolute. Counsel is required only if the pretrial proceeding qualifies as a 
“critical stage,” which the Supreme Court has most recently defined “as [a] 
proceeding[] between an individual and agents of the State (whether formal or 
informal, in court or out) that amount to trial-like confrontations, at which 
counsel would help the accused in coping with legal problems or . . . meeting 
his adversary.”36 In essence, the critical stage analysis asks whether counsel is 
necessary to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.37 
Hence, in United States v. Wade, the Court declared that an in-person line-
up, where the accused is displayed with others so that a witness may attempt an 
identification, is a critical stage because counsel could both ensure the fair 
conduct of the line-up and use her observations to cross-examine a witness’s 
potentially devastating courtroom identification.38 However, a photographic 
line-up, while just as easily leading to a damaging courtroom identification, is 
not a critical stage, primarily because the defendant’s absence prevents a trial-
like confrontation with the state.39 In another example of contrasting critical 
stage outcomes, the Supreme Court has deemed preliminary hearings to be 
critical stages, since a defendant may challenge the state’s probable cause for 
the offense by examining and cross-examining witnesses, as well as argue the 
need for a mental health exam or lowered bail.40 But a judicial finding of 
 
 32. Id. at 343. 
 33. Shelton v. Alabama, 535 U.S. 654, 661 (2002). 
 34. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967). 
 35. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 69 (1932). 
 36. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 n.16 (2008) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 37. Charlie Gerstein, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 1513, 1517 (2013). 
 38. 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967). 
 39. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973). 
 40. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970). 
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probable cause to authorize a brief period of detention is not a critical stage, as 
“[t]his issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing.”41 
Though the Supreme Court has grappled with the critical stage inquiry for 
over eighty years, it has never addressed an issue near the center of indefinite 
detention without counsel: whether an indigent defendant has a right to counsel 
at the first court appearance.42 The Court came closest to deciding this issue in 
2008 with Rothgery v. Gillespie County.43 Walter Rothgery went six months—
including three weeks in jail—without an attorney on a felony charge of being 
a felon in possession of a weapon.44 Only, Mr. Rothgery had never been 
convicted of a felony.45 Soon after his arrest, Rothgery had one court 
appearance, where a magistrate found probable cause for the arrest, informed 
Rothgery of the charge, and set bail.46 By custom, the prosecutor did not attend 
the proceeding, nor did the county provide counsel to Mr. Rothgery. Instead, 
like Scott County, Gillespie County waited until after Rothgery’s indictment to 
provide an attorney,47 who promptly contacted the prosecutor with proof that 
his client was the victim of a faulty criminal background check.48 Rothgery 
then sued the county for delaying the appointment of counsel, which Rothgery 
asserted would have prevented his indictment and time in jail—most of which 
occurred after his re-arrest upon indictment.49 
When Rothgery’s case reached the Supreme Court, the Court appeared 
poised to decide whether he should have been provided an attorney at his 
initial appearance before the magistrate judge.50 The Court instead answered 
the antecedent question of whether Rothgery’s right to counsel “attached” at 
the initial appearance. The general rule is that the right to counsel attaches 
once a criminal prosecution has begun; thereafter, the state must appoint 
counsel within a reasonable time to provide competent representation at any 
subsequent critical stage.51 The Court had twice held that attachment occurs at 
the first appearance before a judicial officer.52 Yet Gillespie County asserted 
that the absence of a prosecutor meant that Rothgery’s prosecution had not 
 
 41. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975). 
 42. Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 333–34 
(2011). 
 43. 554 U.S. 191, 194–95 (2008). 
 44. Id. at 196. 
 45. Id. at 195. 
 46. Id. at 196. 
 47. Id. at 196–97. 
 48. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196–97. 
 49. Id. at 197. 
 50. See Colbert, supra note 41, at 341. 
 51. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 211–12. 
 52. Id. at 199. 
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begun.53 The Court rejected this distinction, clarifying that the prosecutor’s 
presence was immaterial to attachment.54 But the Court explicitly left for 
another day the resolution of “whether the 6-month delay in appointment of 
counsel resulted in prejudice to Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment rights,” and it 
also declined to articulate what standards might govern that decision.55 Until 
then, this task falls to the states and lower courts. As was the case before 
Rothgery, most states still do not guarantee counsel at the first appearance.56 
II.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S LIMITS IN ADDRESSING INDEFINITE DETENTION 
WITHOUT COUNSEL 
Rothgery reveals a major crack in the Court’s right to counsel 
jurisprudence. By sidestepping whether counsel is required at the first 
appearance, states must continue measuring the timing for counsel 
appointment backward from the next critical stage—i.e., estimate when the 
critical stage will occur, and calculate how far in advance of that stage counsel 
must be appointed. To avoid such guesswork, several commentators have 
asserted that counsel is required at the first appearance because a defendant’s 
fundamental right to pretrial liberty is at stake. They contend that defendants 
must have representation at first appearance bail hearings—which have not 
been declared critical stages—to guard against arbitrary detention.57 Valuable 
in its own right, securing pretrial release also improves a defendant’s chances 
at a favorable outcome either in plea bargaining or at trial.58 Further, bail 
hearings typically involve complex questions beyond the layperson’s ken, such 
as the propriety of nonmonetary bond and release conditions. On these 
grounds, New York’s highest court has declared that the first appearance is a 
critical stage under the Sixth Amendment,59 while Maryland’s highest court 
reached the same conclusion under the state constitution’s due process 
clause.60 
I agree with these commentators and these courts that bail hearings should 
qualify as critical stages. But no one should expect that such a ruling from the 
Supreme Court will be enough to halt indefinite detention without counsel. 
One problem in places like Mississippi is that bail often is not set in a hearing. 
Many judges and law enforcement officers instead rely on bail schedules, 
 
 53. Id. at 197–98. 
 54. Id. at 207–08. 
 55. Id. at 213. 
 56. See Colbert, supra note 41, at 386. 
 57. E.g., Gerstein, supra note 36, at 1523; Colbert, supra note 41, at 344. 
 58. Will Dobbie, et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and 
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges (The Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 22511, 2016). 
 59. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223–24 (N.Y. 2010). 
 60. DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019, 1031 (Md. 2013). 
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which prescribe preset bail amounts or ranges according to the alleged 
offense.61 
In fact, most places are like Mississippi on this score. By one survey, 
nearly two-thirds of counties around the country use bail schedules.62 
Consequently, many arrestees find that a judge has set bail before they are 
brought to court. As we witnessed time and again in Mississippi, if bail is 
addressed at the initial appearance, the only thing judges consider beyond the 
schedule is the arresting officer’s recommendation as to the bail amount. Yes, 
the arresting officer. The prosecutor is rarely present. It is thus a fair 
assumption that most arrestees jailed on bail they cannot afford have never 
received anything resembling a hearing on their right to pretrial release. 
Indeed, the whole point of bail schedules is to eliminate such hearings.63 
A likely rejoinder is that bail schedules are unconstitutional; they violate 
Supreme Court precedent prohibiting wealth-based detention and requiring 
individualized bail determinations. In fact, a number of courts and the 
Department of Justice have condemned bail schedules on these grounds.64 
Again, I agree. But the constitutional status of bail schedules says nothing 
about whether an initial appearance is a critical stage. The answer to that 
question is tied instead to another: when are states required to provide an 
individualized bail hearing—at the initial appearance, or some later date? 
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue of by when an 
arrestee must receive a bail hearing. In Gerstein v. Pugh, where the Court 
recognized the right to a prompt probable cause hearing, the Court allowed 
states to experiment with conducting the probable cause and bail 
 
 61. See Lindsay Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion? 26 CRIM. JUST. 
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 64. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057–58 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); State v. 
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determinations at the initial appearance.65 While the Court later ruled that the 
probable cause determination must happen within forty-eight hours of arrest,66 
regardless of when the initial appearance occurs, it has remained silent on 
whether arrestees have a comparable constitutional right to a prompt bail 
determination.67 
Absent a constitutional requirement that states must conduct meaningful 
bail hearings at the first appearance, it is far from certain that the Court will 
require counsel at a proceeding most judges could literally conduct without 
looking up at or hearing from the defendant, where they need only recite the 
alleged charges and preset bail amount.68 There is nothing “trial-like” about 
this process, though, as described above, the outcome of that process—release 
or detention—may prejudice the outcome in a defendant’s case. Yet, even if 
the Court finally settles whether initial appearances are critical stages and/or 
the required promptness of bail hearings, there remains another puzzle to 
solving indefinite detention without counsel: when must counsel be appointed 
if the initial appearance and/or bail hearing is delayed? Or simply never 
happens? 
Consider the curious case of Jessica Jauch. Police in Starkville, Mississippi 
arrested Ms. Jauch on April 26, 2012, for several traffic offenses.69 The police 
then transferred Ms. Jauch to the nearby Choctaw County jail because she had 
an outstanding misdemeanor warrant in that jurisdiction.70 Ms. Jauch cleared 
the warrant, but remained in jail after learning that the Choctaw County grand 
jury had issued a felony indictment against her in January 2012.71 
Unfortunately, Choctaw County was not in trial term when Jauch was arrested, 
and would not be until August.72 Tragically, like Walter Rothgery, Jessica 
Jauch was innocent. Despite her repeated assertions of innocence and requests 
to be taken to a judge to post bail, Ms. Jauch sat in jail for 96 days. She finally 
appeared in court on July 31, 2012, wherein the judge appointed counsel and 
 
 65. 420 U.S. 103, 123–25 (1975). 
 66. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58–59 (1991). 
 67. The Court has recognized that “[a] prompt hearing is necessary,” but in the context of 
interpreting the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 
711, 716 (1990). 
 68. See Pauch v. Gautreaux, 973 F. Supp. 2d 658 (M.D. La. 2013) (holding that arrestee’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach because the only hearing during seven months 
of detention was a video “jail callout” where a non-judge court commissioner set bail according 
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637 F. App’x 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “preliminary bail determination” did not 
render initial appearance a critical stage). 
 69. Jauch v. Choctaw Cty., No. 1:15-cv-75-SA-SAA, 2016 WL 5720649, at *1 (N.D. Miss. 
Sept. 30, 2016). 
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set bail. Ms. Jauch was released on August 6, 2012, and the prosecution finally 
dropped the charges against her in January 2013. 
For those advocating the right to counsel at initial appearance, what should 
we make of Ms. Jauch’s ordeal? She received counsel and a bail determination 
at her first appearance, but by that time she had been locked in jail for three 
months.73 Like Walter Rothgery, Ms. Jauch filed a federal civil rights action 
against the county and its sheriff for the delays in bringing her to court and 
appointing counsel.74 The federal district court made quick work of these 
claims. The court first dismissed Ms. Jauch’s presentment claim on due 
process grounds.75 It found that, because Ms. Jauch had already been indicted 
on the felony charge, she had no right to an initial appearance within forty-
eight hours under Mississippi law, since the indictment supplied the requisite 
probable cause finding.76 Denying Ms. Jauch’s right to counsel claim thus 
became a matter of course under Rothgery—she was not subjected to a critical 
stage before her first appearance, and she received counsel at that first 
appearance.77 The Sixth Amendment apparently requires nothing more. 
The cases described above, particularly Jessica Jauch’s, force the question 
of whether the Sixth Amendment is equal to the challenge of indefinite 
detention without counsel. The Supreme Court has made the right to pretrial 
counsel contingent on how the proceeding in question either affects or mimics 
the trial. This is entirely the wrong question. Once counsel was appointed, Josh 
Bassett, Walter Rothgery, and Jessica Jauch all had their cases dismissed by 
the prosecution without a trial. It is therefore hard to say counsel was 
appointed too late to protect their right to a fair trial. While theirs is certainly 
not the experience of most defendants subjected to prolonged pretrial 
detention—many of whom are willing to plead guilty despite their 
innocence—it does suggest the limitations of such an instrumentalist view of 
counsel’s importance. 
III.  A NEW PATH: EQUAL ACCESS TO COURTS 
Rather than ask whether counsel is necessary to protect a defendant’s right 
a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment, the better question is whether we can 
condone a criminal justice system that tolerates unequal treatment of 
defendants based on wealth. Indefinite detention without counsel is almost 
exclusively the experience of the poor. Wealthier defendants can simply buy 
their way out of it by retaining counsel. Such inequities are properly addressed 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 
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 74. Jauch, 2015 WL 5720649, at *2. 
 75. Id. at *13. 
 76. Id. at *2 (citing Unif. R. of Cir & Cty. Ct. 6.05). 
 77. Id. at *4. 
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and the Court’s line of cases establishing the right of meaningful access to 
courts. Framed this way, the right to counsel inquiry shifts from whether 
counsel is needed to avoid prejudice at a defendant’s trial to whether counsel is 
needed to ensure that defendants are being treated fairly without regard to their 
resources. 
The Court’s access to courts jurisprudence finds its origins in Powell v. 
Alabama,78 where the Court addressed the right to counsel in the infamous 
“Scottsboro boys” capital case. Though limiting itself to the extraordinary facts 
presented, the Court made clear its broader concern with “the inequitable 
treatment of indigents in criminal proceedings” and “indigents’ ability to 
participate in the judicial process.”79 The Court later held in Griffin v. Illinois 
that the state could not deny trial transcripts on appeal to those unable to afford 
them when such access was necessary to secure meaningful appellate review.80 
In sweeping terms, the plurality opinion declared that, “There can be no equal 
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he 
has.”81 
This same principle of equal access is easily recognized in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, the Court’s landmark decision guaranteeing state defendants the 
right to counsel in felony cases.82 Though the Court grounded its decision in 
the Sixth Amendment, Gideon channeled Griffin, expressly noting that 
criminal justice systems must guarantee that “every defendant stands equal 
before the law.”83 In the Court’s view, that counsel was an element essential to 
equality was apparent from the fact that “there are few defendants charged 
with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to 
prepare and present their defenses.”84 Indeed, as originally understood, the 
Sixth Amendment primarily protected the right to counsel of choice for those 
who could afford attorneys.85 Affirmatively requiring states to provide counsel 
to the indigent was therefore a radical shift, and one that only truly makes 
sense if the goal is to equalize access to the justice system. 
It is worth noting that the parties in Gideon expressly grappled over 
whether Griffin’s equal access rule required the appointment of counsel in 
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criminal cases.86 And the same day the Court issued Gideon, it also decided 
Douglas v. California, which held that Griffin required the appointment of 
counsel on a defendant’s first appeal as of right.87 More explicit about its equal 
access framework, the Douglas Court explained: 
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where 
the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s 
examination into the record, research of the law, and marshaling of arguments 
on his behalf, while the indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are 
hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a 
meaningful appeal.88 
Taken together, Griffin, Gideon, and Douglas support the proposition that 
relative wealth should not dictate a defendant’s treatment in the criminal 
justice system. If the “basic tools” necessary for fair treatment are available for 
a price, the state must guarantee access to those for whom that price is too 
high.89 From the equal access perspective, indefinite detention without counsel 
is not acceptable simply because the state fails to initiate a critical stage 
proceeding, though the practice may survive—and has survived—a Sixth 
Amendment challenge. Instead, the practice is unconstitutional because 
detained defendants with means would invariably hire an attorney to seek 
every available avenue to secure their release. 
That a separate constitutional provision might guarantee a right to counsel 
outside the Sixth Amendment is not unusual. As mentioned above, the 
Fourteenth Amendment already guarantees a right to counsel on appeal, along 
with a right to counsel for juveniles facing detention in juvenile court.90 And 
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to counsel for those facing 
custodial interrogation91—an iconic feature of Miranda warnings—is arguably 
better known than the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee. The Court declared all of 
these rights either at the time of or after deciding Gideon. The Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel is especially significant because, like the equal 
access rule proposed here, it applies before a prosecution commences. 
Thus, particularly for those facing detention, the equal access framework 
proposed here untethers the right to counsel from the Sixth Amendment’s more 
rigid reliance on attachment, critical stages, and trial outcomes. A person’s 
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experience with the criminal justice system may begin before their prosecution, 
and includes more dimensions than will ever be addressed at trial. For 
example, it is difficult to conceive how the amount of bail prescribed ex parte 
by a schedule would ever become a substantive issue at trial.92 Yet those who 
can and those who cannot afford that bail amount will experience dramatically 
different justice systems. As the families of Kalief Browder93 and Sandra 
Bland94 can attest, the difference is all too often that between life and death. 
The right to counsel at the first appearance—or upon detention—necessarily 
flows from the imperative to eliminate invidious discrimination of this sort. 
Critical stage or not, if a jurisdiction sets bail with a schedule, defendants with 
access to counsel, but who cannot afford bail, will have the means to contest 
that determination immediately. States cannot price the indigent out of the 
same opportunity. 
Equal access thus allows a re-evaluation of the Jessica Jauch case. Had she 
been able to afford counsel, that attorney could have challenged her detention 
without bond through a habeas petition in the local trial courts,95 or with a 
petition to the state appellate courts.96 Counsel also could have begun 
preparing her defense, uncovered the evidence of her innocence, and 
confronted the prosecutor to have the case dismissed. Counsel could have done 
all this without waiting three months for the next trial term. The fact that Ms. 
Jauch’s lack of wealth blocked her access to these vital protections 
undoubtedly violates the principles of equal justice outlined above. The same 
is true for every other defendant trapped in our nation’s systems of indefinite 
detention. 
CONCLUSION 
Eradicating indefinite detention without counsel is not possible without 
first freeing defendants from the strictures of the Sixth Amendment’s critical 
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stage analysis. Pretrial detention is critical in its own right. Jailing an 
unconvicted person is always an emergency. It is an emergency to which 
people with means respond by hiring a lawyer. But, for the indigent in places 
like Mississippi, it is an emergency that too often goes unanswered. While the 
Constitution may tolerate delaying counsel until a critical stage, it cannot 
tolerate dual criminal justice systems based on wealth. Recognizing this 
command under the equal protection and due process principles outlined 
above, though a departure from the Court’s recent Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, is more fundamentally a return to that doctrine’s roots in 
meaningful and equal access to courts. It is also the clearest way to end the 
shame of indefinite detention without counsel. 
 
